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Abstract
Previous research has shown that the rewards people receive are often taken as indirect 
evidence of their competence. Meanwhile, economic inequality has increased in the US 
over the past several generations. I propose that variation in economic inequality – the 
distribution of rewards in society – alters perceptions of the merits of people at different 
strata in society according to an assumption of equity. I use Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk) to experimentally manipulate the level of inequality (high vs low) participants 
perceive in an anonymized country, and I measure participants’ perceptions of merit for 
people in that country’s 90th and 10th income percentiles. Results show that participants 
expected greater differences in merit in the high inequality condition compared to the low 
inequality condition, and they expect that a high inequality country should demonstrate 
greater variation in merit than a low inequality country.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
One of the most persistent puzzles in the social sciences is why people tolerate 
inequality, even when they are disadvantaged by it. An increase in inequality will 
disadvantage more people than it advantages, and theories of rational choice predict that 
this should lead to increasing concern about inequality, and increasing support for 
redistributive policies (Alesina and Giuliano 2011). Because inequality has increased 
dramatically over the past generation, we would predict a similarly dramatic increase in 
public worry about inequality and its implications for the justice of social institutions 
(Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alvaredo et al. 2013; Piketty and Saez 2014; Wolff 2010). 
Though this self-interest argument is logically compelling, it does not correspond well 
with patterns of social opinions. In fact, today there is a relative paucity of concern about 
inequality – certainly less than one would predict based on the increasing number of 
people disadvantaged by inequality (Ashok, Kuziemko, and Washington 2015; Norton 
and Ariely 2011; Osberg and Smeeding 2006; Shepelak and Alwin 1986).   
This study proposes that people use deeply held assumptions about meritocracy 
and equity to draw inferences about the overall competence and worth of people 
throughout the income distribution. I argue that people are prone to interpret information 
about inequality as providing evidence that some people are highly capable, while others 
are not. Increasing inequality will then result in an even wider gap in perceived 
competence between the rich and the poor. 
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The most commonly and deeply accepted norm governing the level of rewards a 
person should justly expect to receive is the norm of equity (Kluegel and Smith 1986; 
Kunovich and Slomczynski 2007; Reynolds and Xian 2014). The equity principle states 
that a person’s rewards should be proportional to his or her abilities and effort (Adams 
1965; Homans 1961; Jasso and Rossi 1977). When a society distributes reward equitably, 
it is said to be a meritocracy. In a meritocracy, rewards (like income or wealth) are a 
direct result of a person’s competence and hard work, rather than luck, or social forces 
like the station of one’s parents, or one’s social connections. A pure meritocracy would 
not create a level distribution, where all earn the same reward, but would instead 
distribute high rewards to those of greater merit, and fewer rewards to those of lesser 
merit (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Ferrara 2005). A proponent of the ideal 
of meritocracy would be concerned less with the level of inequality per se than the degree 
to which that inequality stems from factors related to merit vs. non-merited based factors. 
A common focus in the social sciences is to investigate the extent of inequality in 
a given society, its causes, and to what extent inequality is based on merit. In contrast, the 
purpose of this research is to ask how people use information about inequality to derive 
assumptions about the distribution of merit in society, given the cultural pervasiveness of 
meritocratic values and assumptions. Following prior claims (Berger et al. 1998; Brezina 
and Winder 2003; Della Fave 1980; Fiske et al. 2002), I argue that levels of reward in 
society are taken as indirect signals of merit. After all, merit (traits like competence, work 
ethic, moral virtue) is more difficult for people to observe than outward signs of success 
or failure like wealth. Assuming that rewards are distributed proportionally to merit helps 
maintain beliefs in a just world (Benabou and Tirole 2006).  
3 
 
It is clear from previous work that perceptions of merit are unequally distributed 
and are related to the wealth of the people being evaluated – that is, people clearly 
believe that the wealthy are more meritorious than the poor. What has been neglected in 
prior work is the causal relationship between inequality and judgments of merit. By 
extension, we do not know how people draw inferences from the level of inequality to 
inequality of merit. Do people tend to assume that the rich are more meritorious from the 
poor regardless of the extent of inequality? Or can higher levels of inequality lead to 
perceptions of greater differences in merit of the rich and poor? The goal of this research 
is to posit and test just such a relationship, in which perceptions of greater (vs lesser) 
inequality lead people to believe that there is a larger (smaller) gap in merit between the 
rich and the poor. In the next sections I review relevant theoretical and empirical 
research, state a specific hypothesis, and present the design and results of an online 
survey experiment conducted to test the hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2 – Background Literature  
 Several strands of research inform the theoretical proposition that inequality will 
affect expectations of merit of the different strata of society. These literatures establish 
that 1) the general population does not generally have accurate perceptions of the extent 
of inequality, and that those perceptions vary widely; 2) the rich are stereotyped as 
competent and the poor as incompetent, and their stations in life are often attributed to 
personal factors rather than external, structural ones; 3) differences of resources and 
rewards in groups tend to translate into corresponding differences in status and 
performance expectations; and 4) belief in meritocracy, mobility, and the primacy of 
personal qualities reduces concern about inequality and preferences for redistribution. I 
briefly review each in turn.  
 First, studies in recent years have established that the public generally is not 
aware of the extent of inequality in America. Studies disagree, however, about whether 
the public over- or under-estimates inequality. Several studies by Kraus obtained 
estimates of social mobility and found that Americans tended to over-estimate how many 
people moved up or down from the income rank they were born into. (Kraus and Tan 
2015; Kraus 2015). Other research has noted that people generally believe that income 
inequality is lower than it actually is (Norton and Ariely 2011), a finding which largely 
persists after accounting for methodological problems (Eriksson and Simpson 2012), and 
which is more pronounced for higher-income individuals (Dawtry, Sutton, and Sibley 
2015; Osberg and Smeeding 2006). In contrast, some work has found opposite patterns. 
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Chambers and colleagues conducted several studies using a variety of measures and 
found that Americans underestimated social mobility, overestimated income inequality, 
and believed that inequality had increased much more over the last several decades than it 
actually did (Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker 2014, 2015). Regardless of whether 
Americans over- or under-estimate these inequality and mobility, lay people rarely 
possess an accurate understanding of the precise degree of inequality and mobility in 
society. Moreover, Americans disagree widely about whether there is too much 
inequality (Osberg and Smeeding 2006) and about the desirability of redistribution 
(Alesina and Ferrara 2005; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Fisman et al. 2015; Shepelak and 
Alwin 1986). 
Second, research on stereotypes and poverty attribution shows the rich are 
stereotyped as more generally competent, while the poor are stereotyped as less generally 
competent (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007; Fiske et al. 2002). The prestige accorded to 
occupations is similarly stratified and seen as just (Kelley and Evans 1993). People 
commonly attribute poverty to personal traits and factors, like laziness, drug abuse, or 
criminality, and attribute wealth to similarly personal factors like intelligence and drive 
(Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler 2001; Lepianka, Van Oorschot, and Gelissen 2009). 
Third, research on group processes has shown that members of task groups adjust 
their performance expectations to be in line with the level of rewards group members 
have received (Berger et al. 1998; Cook 1975; Fişek and Hysom 2008; Harrod 1980; 
Hysom and Fişek 2011). If a group member is rewarded more highly than others, those 
other group members come to expect better performance from that person, and tend to 
interpret their contributions more favorably. When a group member is rewarded less 
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highly than others, those others come to expect less competent input, and are more likely 
to resist that person’s attempts at influence.  
Research and theory on the construction of status beliefs has found that a 
correlation between resources and an initially, neutrally valued nominal characteristic 
tends to lead to the creation of status beliefs – implicit or explicit beliefs about the 
relative competence and abilities of people who possess that nominal characteristic 
(Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000; Ridgeway 1991). Resources 
(like income, skills, or social capital) increase one’s ability to accomplish goals in a 
group, but that ability is often attributed instead to one’s personal qualities or group 
memberships. In ‘doubly dissimilar’ interactions -- i.e., those in which group members 
vary on both resource levels and nominal characteristics -- group members associate 
competence and performance with one state of a characteristic (e.g,. male) more than the 
other state (e.g. female). When the characteristic correlates with a biasing factor like 
resources, doubly dissimilar encounters will lead interactants to associate one state of the 
characteristic with competence more than the other state. For example, knowledge that 
blacks are relatively disadvantaged in society has been shown to contribute to negative 
stereotyping (Brezina and Winder 2003). 
Lastly, a wealth of research shows that inequality is more palatable the more it is 
seen as part of an equitable social economic system. The umbrella phrase ‘just-world 
belief’ describes a variety of attitudes which attribute economic and social outcomes to 
socially legitimate, fair, and just processes. When people hold just-world beliefs, they are 
less likely to advocate for redistributive economic policies (Benabou and Tirole 2006; 
Bullock, Williams, and Limbert 2003; Kuhn 2015). Likewise, when people expect either 
7 
 
to move up the socioeconomic ladder themselves, or expect that their children will likely 
do so, they are less likely to support redistribution or express concern about inequality 
(Benabou and Ok 2001; Shariff, Wiwad, and Aknin 2016). These are reasonable 
consequences of believing in the reality and efficacy of meritocracy – if people believe 
that those who deserve more rise (fall) to the top (bottom), then they will also tend to 
believe that no intervention is required to create a more equitable distribution of 
economic resources like income and wealth. 
These studies contribute to our understanding of the social psychology of 
inequality. However, there are several reasons why they do not fully explore how 
inequality itself influences perceptions about society and the people in it. First, inequality 
is more often used to predict outcomes like health or happiness rather than attitudes 
(Oishi, Kesebir, and Diener 2011; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009) rather than attitudes. And 
second, studies of inequality-related attitudes and perceptions often do not use inequality 
itself as a predictor (Bullock et al. 2003; Cozzarelli et al. 2001; Kuhn 2015; Lepianka et 
al. 2009). Such studies can say little about the impact of the level of inequality on 
attitudes. To do so, researchers must either acquire data on levels of inequality in their 
participants’ contexts, or use experiments to directly manipulate participants’ 
perceptions. This study addresses each issue by using an experiment to manipulate 
inequality and determine its effects, specifically measuring theoretically relevant 
attitudes. In doing so, it contributes to recent efforts to use experimental methodology to 
understand how inequality shapes social perceptions and preferences (Cruces, Perez-
Truglia, and Tetaz 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2013; Shariff et al. 2016).
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Chapter 3 – Hypothesis 
We propose that people take information about existing inequality as implicit 
evidence of the competence, skill, and deservingness of the people who occupy different 
positions in the economic distribution. When people see society as being characterized by 
a relatively large income differential, they should adjust their expectations to reflect a 
society where the wealthy are much more competent than the poor (and the poor much 
less competent than the rich). When they see society as having relatively low inequality, 
they should adjust their expectations to reflect a society where rich and poor differ less in 
their competence. Or more formally: 
Hypothesis: The higher the perceived inequality in a given country, the larger the 
difference in expected merit between top and bottom earners. 
This hypothesis will be supported if perceiving higher inequality leads people to evaluate 
the those with higher incomes as more meritorious, or the poor less meritorious, or both, 
relative to those same ratings when they perceive lower inequality. 
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Chapter 4 – Method 
In order to test these predictions, I needed to present participants with an 
informational treatment describing a society with high or low inequality, and elicit from 
them ratings about people from that society. I did not present information about the US 
because, while I am interested in American-style meritocratic beliefs, I wanted to test the 
effects of this belief separately from participants’ preconceived, idiosyncratic beliefs 
about the desirability or justice of the American economic system. I also wanted a sample 
with greater variation in socioeconomic status than commonly-used college student 
populations. Many perspectives on attitudes toward inequality and redistribution stress 
economic self-interest (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Cruces et al. 2013),  so any study of 
these attitudes limited to college student populations may be validly criticized as not 
addressing potentially important moderators. The online survey experiment format is 
suited to these needs. I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) platform, an online 
labor market that allows requesters to post tasks that users (or ‘workers’) can complete 
for monetary rewards. Though there are many international workers on mTurk (see 
Eriksson and Simpson 2010), I restricted the sample to American respondents to 
maximize the chance that they adhere to an American-style belief in meritocracy 
(Kluegel and Smith 1986).  
Workers use their accounts to participate in a wide range of tasks, including 
surveys, market research, and machine learning. Social science researchers have found 
that mTurk provides high-quality data from a wider range of respondents than other
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commonly used convenience samples, such as experiments with university students 
(Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Eriksson and 
Simpson 2010; Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci and Chandler 2014; Rand 2012). Tasks on 
mTurk are brief, usually less than 10 minutes long, and pay an hourly rate of around 
$6.00. This study is typical in this respect: sessions paid $1.00 and lasted about eight 
minutes on average.  
Participants were told a cover story about researchers being interested in 
impression formation under low-information conditions and were presented with a page 
describing three countries: Countries K, L, and M, which varied in their income 
distribution.  I described the income distribution as a ratio of the income of the 90th 
percentile to the income of the 10th percentile within each country. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either a high inequality condition, in which Country M had the 
highest income ratio (16.4:1), or the low inequality condition, in which Country M had 
the lowest income ratio (3.0:1).  The World Bank provides estimates of the income shares 
held by the top and bottom 10% in many countries. This ratio was 30.2:1.7 in the US in 
2013, and 6.0:1 in Iceland in 2012 (World Bank 2016). I reduced these ratios to reflect 
the fact that much of the income share held by the top decile is in fact held by those 
above the 95th percentile (Alvaredo et al. 2013), so the ratio of the 90th percentile’s 
earnings to those of the 10th percentile is lower than the ratio of those decile’s earnings.  
As comprehension checks, participants had to name which country had the best-
off 90th percentile, and were given three chances to answer correctly before continuing. 
Next, they were ‘randomly’ assigned to answer additional questions about Country M, 
and asked two more comprehension checks requiring them to provide the correct income 
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ratio of Country M and state correctly whether that ratio was the highest, lowest, or a 
middling level of inequality compared to the other two. In addition to ensuring 
comprehension, these questions were designed to encourage participants to focus more 
carefully on the information provided. Participants were excluded from the analysis if 
they failed to answer a comprehension check item correctly after three tries. Only one 
participant was dropped from data analysis for failing this criterion.  
After the manipulation and comprehension checks, participants were asked to 
imagine an average member of the 90th or 10th percentile in their target nation. To test 
expectations of merit, participants rated how much they believed citizens of the target 
country would attribute various traits to that person. This follows previous research on 
stereotypes content which asked for estimates of general attitudes and perceptions 
(Cuddy et al. 2007; Fiske et al. 2002). This ‘merit’ scale was composed of five items of 
the form ‘How ______ do people in this country think this person is?’ (confident, 
competent, hardworking, deserving), and was administered with several filler questions 
using the same form. Participants completed each scale twice; once for an average person 
from the 90th percentile, and again for an average person from the 10th percentile, with the 
presentation order randomly determined. 
I also included several exploratory measures to further investigate whether 
inequality would affect expectations of competence, and also whether it would affect 
expectations of mobility. Perceived mobility has been shown to influence concern about 
inequality and preferences for redistribution, and merit-based mobility would be an 
outcome of an ideally equitable, meritocratic system (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; 
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Shariff et al. 2016). So, while not as theoretically motivated as the prediction for merit, I 
believe there is reason to expect that inequality may influence expectations of mobility.  
Participants were asked to estimate the future mobility of a young person from the 
middle of the income distribution (the 50th percentile), given that the young person was 
either low or high merit (‘this person has a strong (weak) work ethic, is very (not very) 
intelligent, and has high (few) ambitions for their life’). They were asked to predict where 
this person would end up once they reached their peak earning potential in late middle 
age, both in terms of income percentile and education. Participants answered this 
question once for a high merit target and again for a low merit target, with the 
presentation order randomly determined.  
Last, participants were again presented with the three countries from the 
beginning: one high inequality, one medium inequality, and one low inequality. They 
were asked to imagine three people, one person from each country’s 90th percentile (or 
10th percentile). They then chose which of these three people were likely to be the most 
generally competent, and which was likely to be the least generally competent. They then 
completed the same two questions for comparisons of both 90th and 10th percenters. 
These items supplement the primary measures of merit and test the same prediction that 
high inequality societies will be seen as resulting from a wider spread of underlying talent 
and merit. If true, the most competent 90th percenters and least competent 10th percenters 
should be expected to come from the high inequality country. These items were 
exploratory, and were always presented last. This means that they are at greater risk of 
fatigue effects that the first several measures, especially given the brevity of most mTurk 
studies. 
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After completing all measures, participants filled out a demographics 
questionnaire asking their age, gender, race/ethnicity, income range, education, social and 
economic political orientation, and subjective socioeconomic status (SSES). SSES is 
measured using a picture of a 10-rung ladder, with the best-off at the top and worst-off at 
the bottom, and asks participants which rung they feel they are on. Subjective perceptions 
of SES have been shown to moderate some economic and redistributive attitudes, net of 
actual SES measures (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2014). Finally, participants were probed for 
suspicion, debriefed, and paid. 
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Chapter 5 – Results 
I recruited a total of 96 participants from mTurk. Of those, one was excluded for 
failing three comprehension checks, and two were excluded for being outside the US, 
leaving a total N of 93 (44% female).  Of the 93, 64 were White, 5 Black, 12 Hispanic or 
Latino, 11 Asian, and 1 Pacific Islander. The average age was 33.6 years old, median 
income range was $45,000-$60,001, median education was a Bachelor’s Degree, and 
average subjective socioeconomic status was 4.8 (on a 10-rung scale). The sample was 
slightly left of center socially (average 3.98 on a 9-point scale) but economically 
moderate (4.68 on a 9-point scale).  
 The merit scale was reliable. Cronbach’s Alpha was .86 for the scale used for the 
90th percentile, .94 for the scale used for the 10th percentile, and .91 for the scale overall. I 
constructed a difference score by subtracting each participant’s ratings of the 10th 
percentile from their ratings of the 90th percentile. This difference score was also reliable, 
Alpha = .90. 
Table 1 details merit ratings by condition. The merit difference score differed 
significantly between conditions (t = 3.28, p < .001). On average, the difference in merit 
ratings of the 90th and 10th percentiles was 1.59 points larger, on a nine-point scale in the 
high inequality condition than the low inequality condition (2.08 vs 0.49). Since this is 
simply the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles, I compared the means of 90th 
and 10th percentile ratings separately to determine their relative importance in driving this 
effect. Ratings of the 90th percentile did not differ significantly between conditions.  
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However, there was an effect of condition on ratings of the 10th percentile (t = -5.31, p 
<.001). On average, participants in the high inequality condition rated the 10th percentile 
about 2 points lower in merit on a 9-point scale (4.36 vs 6.38). This supports the 
hypothesis that greater inequality leads to greater variation in perceptions of merit, and it 
furthermore indicates that this effect is driven entirely by differences in perceptions of the 
poor, rather than the rich.  
 
Table 5.1 – T-tests of Mean Merit Ratings 
 
 Condition 
 Low Inequality  High Inequality 
90th Percentile 6.88(.41) 6.43(.50) 
10th Percentile 6.38 (.48) 4.36 (.62)*** 
Difference (90th -10th) 0.49(.47) 2.08 (.85)*** 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses 
*** Conditions differ at p ≤ .001 
 
 Previous research has shown that attitudes such as poverty attribution and 
concerns about inequality are moderated by political orientation (Lepianka et al. 2009; 
Shepelak 1989), economic self-interest (Cruces et al. 2013), and subjective 
socioeconomic status (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2014). Consequently, I investigated any 
moderation of condition by demographic variables by testing each demographic variable 
individually. Neither ratings of 90th percentile nor 10th percentile were significantly 
moderated by any of these demographic characteristics. The lack of moderation by any 
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demographic characteristic is surprising and may seem to contradict patterns found in 
past research.  I discuss this in more detail in the discussion section.  
If participants see merit as varying more widely in more unequal countries, they 
should see merit as being more important to the mobility of a given individual. Thus I 
predicted an effect of condition on expectations for merit-based mobility. However, I did 
not find an effect of condition on mobility expectations, either for income rank or 
educational attainment. That is, participants in both conditions held similar expectations 
for the mobility of a very (or not very) competent person. I propose possible explanations 
for this null finding in the discussion section.  
In the final section of the study, participants answered several exploratory 
‘competence choice’ items. In these, participants were again presented with three 
anonymous countries, varying in level of inequality. They were asked to predict which 
country would produce a) the most competent 90th percenter, b) the least competent 90th 
percenter, c) the most competent 10th percenter, and d) the least competent 10th percenter. 
Here I did not expect differences by condition.   
Table 2 shows the results of the competence choice items. None of the items 
differed significantly by condition, so I report results across conditions. These results 
support the hypothesis that inequality causes greater variation in expectations of 
competence. Participants predicted that the most competent 90th percenters would come 
from the high inequality country (54.8%), while the least competent 90th percenters 
would come from the low inequality country (53.8%) (Χ2 = 61.14, p < 0.001). Likewise, 
they predicted that the most competent 10th percenters would come from the low 
inequality country (48.4%), while the least competent 10th percenters would come from 
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the high inequality country (54.8%) (Χ2 = 61.88, p < 0.001). In other words, participants 
expected that citizens in the low inequality country would be characterized by a relatively 
narrower range of competence, with the poor being closer in competence to the rich, and 
vice versa, while the high inequality country would produce people from a relatively 
wider range of competence, with the rich and poor being even more superlatively 
competent or incompetent. This finding closely parallels the results from the merit ratings 
discussed above and strongly supports the theoretical argument. 
 
Table 5.2 – Predicted Country of Origin for Specific Individuals 
 
 Low Inequality 
Country 
Medium Inequality 
Country 
High Inequality 
Country 
Most competent 90th percenter 31 (33.3%) 11 (11.8%) 51 (54.8%) 
Least competent 90th percenter 50 (53.8%) 10 (10.8%) 33 (35.5%) 
Most competent 10th percenter 45 (48.4%) 14 (15.1%) 34 (36.6%) 
Least competent 10th percenter 36 (38.7%) 6 (6.5%) 51 (54.8%) 
Note: Frequencies reported are for all conditions. 
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Chapter 6 – Discussion 
Overall, this study supports the hypothesis that perceptions of inequality have an 
independent effect on the merit that people expect from people from different strata of 
society. When we measured the expected merits of people at the 90th and 10th percentiles 
of a society, participants considering the high inequality society expected significantly 
less merit from the poor than those considering the lower inequality society. Much 
previous work shows that attributing economic outcomes (especially poverty) to 
individuals’ merits tends to reduce concern about inequality, and make redistributive 
policies less desirable, and can even promote discrimination and stereotyping (Bullock et 
al. 2003; Cozzarelli et al. 2001; McCoy and Major 2007). Given this, my research 
suggests that by altering perceptions of merit in society, inequality may sow the seeds of 
its own stability since increasing levels of (perceived) inequality are met with 
exaggerated perceptions of differences in merit between those in higher and lower socio-
economic strata.  
 No demographic characteristic moderated this pattern. Previous research often 
shows a pattern in which concern about inequality or agreement with redistributive 
policies is moderated by factors such as political ideology (Shepelak 1989) or subjective 
socioeconomic status (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2014). The lack of moderation may have 
resulted from a design decision. Instead of asking for participants’ personal beliefs about 
the target individuals’ traits, we asked them to give an estimate of what they thought 
people in that country would generally believe about this person. Such a question format 
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has been used in previous research on competence stereotypes (Fiske et al. 2002), but this 
research did not examine in depths the possible differences between personal views and 
such estimates of others’ views. In contrast, participants may have generalized their own 
opinions to others, since they had little information with which to make that judgment. In 
this case, participants’ responses would in fact represent their own opinions.  
It may very well be that such expectations are relatively consensual, with people 
generally agreeing on how others will view other people, even while personal 
interpretations may vary with one’s demographics. Surprisingly, little research on views 
about inequality or poverty attributions has addressed whether people achieve greater 
consensus on expectations of others’ interpretation than in personal views. Likewise, 
little has been done outside of group processes to investigate the effects on such 
expectations of others on inequality-related behaviors (activities like protests), especially 
when they compete with personal views (Troyer and Younts 1997; Zelditch 2001).  
The competence choice section similarly found that participants tended to expect 
wider variation in competence from a high inequality country, and less variation from a 
low inequality country. That is, they expected the high inequality country to produce 
superlatively competent rich people as well as superlatively incompetent poor people, 
compared to the low inequality country. These items asked participants to report their 
own expectations, and so provide tentative evidence that the effect found in the merit 
ratings may not be an artifact of asking for general, as opposed to personal, expectations.  
Mobility expectations, though moderated by several demographic characteristics, 
did not differ by condition. The lack of significant findings may warrant several 
interpretations. First, it may be that the null hypothesis is true and there is no effect of 
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perceived inequality on merit-based mobility expectations. Second, it may be that the 
effects are too small or the variation too large for differences to be detected with a sample 
of 93. Mechanical Turk studies are often much larger, with hundreds or thousands of 
participants (e.g. Kuziemko et al. 2013; Norton and Ariely 2011). Third, participants may 
not have fully understood the question, or the differences between the two versions of the 
question. Fourth, this may be an example of participants losing patience. The mobility 
estimates were always presented second, after participants completed both merit 
measures. Since mTurk studies tend to be short, participants may have simply answered 
the mobility questions quickly in order to finish the study. Fifth, percent measures are 
cognitively intensive, especially in studies of economic inequality. Participants may have 
resorted to shortcuts or heuristics in their answers (Eriksson and Simpson 2012, 2013). A 
future study could resolve these problems by using a non-percentile measure, improving 
the explanation of the question, and testing for comprehension.  
The study as a whole suffers from several limitations. As an online survey, there 
is the likelihood of higher random error from individuals’ varying contexts. This could 
reduce the ability to detect existing relationships. The study involved three sets of 
measures: the merit estimate measures, the mobility estimate measures, and the 
competence choice measures, which were always presented in that order. While questions 
were randomized within each set, the lack of randomization of the sets themselves means 
that any mental exhaustion or impatience on the part of the participant would have 
reduced the effectiveness of the mobility and competence choice items much more than 
the merit ratings. I also examined perceptions of just two income ranks, the 90th and 10th 
percentiles. A fuller study would also obtain measures of perceptions about the middle of 
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the distribution, the ‘middle class,’ and would more fully explore where people see merit 
being distributed in society. 
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the growing social 
psychological and sociological literature on the roots of attitudes about inequality. It 
examines previously neglected questions about inequality’s effects as an independent 
variable on perceptions and expectations and suggests several intriguing directions for 
future research: effects on inequality on expectations of personal characteristics, and the 
dynamics of perceptions of general, consensual attitudes and beliefs. 
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